Page 180 →South Carolina and Geopolitics

Geopolitics is a way of thinking about international relations and analyzing the relationships between political processes and geography. The invasion of Ukraine is a continuation of more than a century of East–West geopolitical tension over territory, political ideology, and economic dominance. Ukraine and other Eastern European states have long been a borderland between East and West, and Russia’s invasion is, in part, an attempt to stop the eastward expansion of Western political organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. It also seems to be Vladimir Putin’s attempt to correct what he sees as Russian weakness after the fall of the Soviet Union, to restore a balanced East–West geopolitical relationship, and to reassert control over an Eastern sphere of influence.

Page 181 →However, Russia has faced more pushback from the Ukrainian military than it anticipated, as well as a united West that has made it clear that it will not tolerate Russian expansion beyond Ukraine. If one of Putin’s goals was to limit NATO expansion, that plan has backfired, with Finland and Sweden having applied in May 2022 to join the organization to bolster their own security against Russian aggression, bringing NATO more firmly to Russia’s doorstep. The invasion of Ukraine also seems to have renewed NATO’s sense of purpose, leading to increased military spending from many of its members, including the United States, which we discuss later. At the time of this writing in the summer of 2022, there is no end in sight for the Russia-Ukraine war, with Russia making gains in eastern Ukraine, but the Ukrainian government and military having regained the areas surrounding Kyiv and continuing to put up a fight in the south and east of the country. Ukrainian cities are in tatters, with more than ten thousand killed and millions of people being displaced. Russia’s losses are harder to calculate, but estimates suggest that it has twice as many deaths as Ukraine.²

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not just a threat to Ukrainians or East–West balance. It is also a threat to the geopolitical norm of territorial integrity, or the idea that military force should not be used to claim another country’s land. This norm has been dominant since 1945 and is part of the United Nations (UN) charter.³ Without it, states like Ukraine that are “buffers” between great powers or alliances (e.g., Russia and NATO) are particularly at risk of conquest.⁴ This geopolitical norm is arguably one of the reasons why interstate wars have been decreasing, especially since the end of the Cold War.⁵ One explanation for why the Western response has been so strong is that NATO and its allies are trying to reinforce territorial integrity and punish Russia for violating it. If Russia is successful in this war, it may encourage Russia and other states (e.g. China in Taiwan) to continue violating the norm; if Russia is unsuccessful, and especially if Western sanctions and support for Ukraine seem to have contributed to Russia’s failure, then the geopolitical norm of territorial integrity may continue to hold and, hopefully, limit interstate wars in the future.

Geopolitical strife, whenever and wherever it occurs, produces ripple effects across space and scale. In the field of geography, scale essentially refers to a level of analysis. Scale is often conceptualized as local, national, or global, but it can also represent spaces in between, such as regions, or even the Page 182 →individual body. Globalization has increased connections between people and places and has complicated our notions of scale, making it harder to distinguish between scales and demonstrating that processes at the global, local, and every scale in between are mutually constituted.⁶ As a result, it has become harder to see events like the Russia-Ukraine war as simply a conflict between the Russian state and the Ukrainian state, or even between East and West. Instead, the economic, social, and political connections facilitated by globalization mean that this conflict has implications in the everyday experiences of individuals and communities far beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Like most Americans, most South Carolinians will only experience the tragedy of the Russia-Ukraine war from afar. Still, many South Carolinians have expressed solidarity with Ukrainians by displaying Ukrainian flags and attending rallies in support of Ukrainian sovereignty.⁷ The Russia-Ukraine war and the tensions between Russia and NATO have also produced a significant amount of anxiety that has left many South Carolinians wondering about the impact of these global geopolitics on their daily lives. Fewer, though, have probably thought much about the processes that give South Carolina an active role in this and other geopolitical disputes. As scholars of European politics and geography, we have fielded many questions from colleagues and students seeking reassurance that the Russia-Ukraine war will not lead to a greater, perhaps nuclear, conflict. Although nuclear war thankfully remains improbable, there are still significant global consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war. This essay explores the geopolitical relationships between South Carolina and Ukraine and demonstrates that, although seemingly a world apart, these places are intimately linked to one another.

In what follows, we examine the links between South Carolina and Ukraine during this geopolitical moment while also drawing attention to the multiscalar relationships between South Carolina and global geopolitics more broadly. First, we discuss the impacts of globalization in shaping social, political, and economic relationships between places. Second, we review how theories of geopolitics—and, in particular, feminist geopolitics—illuminate the ways in which local processes and places shape and are shaped by geopolitics across scale. Third, we explore the geopolitical relationships between South Carolina and Ukraine, with a particular focus on militarization, economic relations, and the role of the Ukrainian diaspora. We demonstrate that South Carolina not only is affected by the Russia-Ukraine war and global geopolitics but also actively shapes these geopolitics in important ways.

The Russia-Ukraine war is significant, not just as a human tragedy or because of the tensions between Russian and Western interests but also because globalization means that most people and places are connected and, therefore, affected to some degree by the events in Ukraine. Globalization commonly refers to the economic, political, and cultural interconnectivity that has accompanied advancements in global trade, communications, travel, and technology. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, a sociologist and global studies scholar, argues that there are three main perspectives of the processes and effects of globalization on societies: (1) Differences in culture and identity will lead to conflict; (2) cultures and societies will become more related and/or similar over time; or (3) a continuous mixing or hybridization between cultures and societies will occur.⁸ The first two perspectives see globalization as a monolithic process, acting top-down on local places, whereas the third allows for a more reciprocal view of how globalization works across scale. As we demonstrate in this essay and elsewhere, local people and places have varying degrees of power to shape geopolitics, which leads to the kind of mixing or hybridization discussed by Pieterse.⁹

Globalization not only affects culture, society, and politics but geography itself. People and places are increasingly and continuously connected, such that time, distance, and space seem to matter less. David Harvey referred to this phenomenon as time-space compression and argued that global capitalism increasingly annihilates space and time.¹⁰ Harvey, a Marxist geographer, sees capitalism as the overriding structure that dictates spatial relationships. The forces of globalization are rooted in the expansion of capital. The expansion of capital increases time-space compression, and as a result, local difference gives way to global homogeneity. The consummate example of this side of globalization is the spread of corporations, such as McDonald’s, which have transcended space and place while typically replacing mom-and-pop establishments. A more recent example is the prevalence and controversy surrounding social media. On one hand, social media has become a powerful force in how people transcend space and time and communicate and network with one another. For example, we discuss in the upcoming text how the Ukrainian diaspora uses social media to mobilize support for Ukraine. On the other hand, questions abound regarding the political impact of these sites, particularly after the 2016 election in the United States. Concerns include the spread of misinformation, privacy of social media users, impacts on democracy and political protests, and the lack of accountability for the Page 184 →creators and corporate owners of these sites. Russia has been the catalyst for much of this critique, as it effectively uses social media to spread disinformation, most recently regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.¹¹

Harvey’s conceptualization of time-space compression and globalization captures the role that technology and global capitalism play in shaping social, political, and economic activity. As we discuss later in this essay, South Carolina and Ukraine are connected through the defense industry, particularly through companies such as Boeing that, for better or worse, shape geopolitical activity by supplying jobs to South Carolinians and military equipment to Ukraine. This kind of global military industrial complex is made possible through globalization and time-space compression and ultimately reinforces processes of uneven development where the interests of capital control the flow of wealth. In Harvey’s view, corporations such as Boeing are the agents of globalization, shaping policy, economics, and geography from the top-down, which, in turn, perpetuates the imperialist dynamics and global inequality of developed versus developing or Global North versus Global South countries. Although useful, Harvey’s approach does not fully consider structures other than capitalism that facilitate globalization and time-space compression.

Doreen Massey, a Marxist feminist geographer, argues for a consideration of the role that other structures and identities (e.g., gender and ethnicity) play in these processes.¹² Perhaps most important, Massey elaborates on the different ways in which people experience mobility in a globalized world, drawing on what she calls a “power geometry,” where some people and places have more access to mobility, networks, and the opportunities afforded through globalization and time-space compression. For example, we discuss later that South Carolinians of Ukrainian descent are likely to react emotionally to the conflict and be motivated to try to make a difference through actions such as donating and raising awareness. The activities of Ukrainians in South Carolina can influence the processes of globalization, even if they may be less significant than those of major defense industries or governments.

Massey reveals an inherent unevenness in the experiences of globalization and time-space compression that affects how people and places experience geopolitics or other global phenomena. NATO, Russia, Ukraine, and even South Carolina all have some capacity to influence and participate in the Russia-Ukraine war, but their ability to act is determined by the power and influence that they wield. The Russia-Ukraine war will have economic, political, and social repercussions that extend well beyond Ukrainian borders, and Page 185 →South Carolina, by virtue of its diverse economics and status as a part of the United States, also has a role to play in these global geopolitics. Although not always obvious, the connections between these distant places reveal a multiscalar geopolitics that is the product of the seemingly endless, yet uneven, connections created by globalization.

As with globalization, there are many ways of thinking about the processes and impacts of geopolitics. The field of geopolitics emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, concurrent with the rise of the national movements and territorial contestations that would lead to World War I and World War II. Geopolitics originally concerned itself with statecraft and territorial expansion in an attempt to understand how states might grow, change, and conflict with one another to address issues surrounding resources, population growth, or identity.¹³ Through the lens of these traditional geopolitics perspectives, the aforementioned reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are a clear attempt to project state power and restore a territorial and political sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. For example, John Mearsheimer, a realist international relations scholar, argues that the war is principally the result of US efforts to “make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s borders,” which Russia views as an existential threat, leading it to invade Ukraine.¹⁴

Overall, traditional geopolitics views geographic and political contestation and cooperation through a very narrow lens. The state is the primary scale of analysis, with very little attention given to other scales (e.g., the scale of the body or local community). The often unintended consequence underlying this focus on the state is that social, political, and economic activity that occurs outside or within the boundaries of the state is overlooked. This leads to a “territorial trap,” where states are the assumed containers for society.¹⁵ However, in a connected and globalized world, we need a geopolitical approach that pays attention to a variety of geographic scales.

A more multiscalar view would suggest that NATO expansion is far from the only factor that led to the Russia-Ukraine war. Robert Person, an international relations scholar, and Michael McFaul, a political scientist and former US ambassador to Russia, provide a regional explanation: The war is Putin’s attempt to bring Ukraine back into the Eastern/Russian sphere of influence. At the national and subnational levels, the invasion is a response to the spread of democracy in a culturally and historically close neighbor, Page 186 →which could lead to calls for democracy domestically in Russia, especially through protest and civil society.¹⁶

Feminist geopolitics has argued extensively for a deeper and wider conception of scale in the study of geopolitics, with particular attention to everyday and embodied experiences. Drawing on the feminist proclamation that the “personal is political,” feminist political geography and feminist geopolitics have argued for an expansion of our understandings of what is political,¹⁷ complicated our notions of politics in the public and private spheres,¹⁸ and considered the roles of gender and the body in the experience of violence, politics, and security.¹⁹ These contributions have not only broadened the field of geopolitics but also helped to illuminate how geopolitical relationships are multiscalar and are shaped by both top-down and bottom-up forces in communities, states, and global processes.

In this essay, we consider the geopolitical relationships between South Carolina and Ukraine through this feminist geopolitical lens. The connections between these seemingly distant places are not immediately clear unless we complicate our notions of scale to not only look at geopolitics at the scale of the state but also trace the connections between local, national, regional, and global communities. Although South Carolina is not a direct participant in the Russia-Ukraine war, it inevitably affects and is affected by these events. We consider these multiscalar geopolitics and the potential consequences for South Carolina through an examination of militarization, economic relations, and the Ukrainian diaspora.

One of the simplest ways to think about the geopolitical relationships between South Carolina and Ukraine is through the lens of militarization. Militarization is the ongoing process by which societies become influenced by or dependent on military values, activities, and attitudes. Militarization is, like geopolitics, a multiscalar process whereby individuals, communities, and nations are increasingly connected to global military activities and defense industries. In feminist geopolitics, Cynthia Enloe is the leading scholar demonstrating how globalization and militarization have come to feed each other, normalizing militarism at all geographic scales, including in our daily lives and in global economic processes.²⁰ South Carolina is heavily embedded in the processes of militarization, which creates significant economic and social patterns, as well as both directly and indirectly linking the Palmetto State to the geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine war.

In 2020, South Carolina had 39,573 active-duty service members, the ninth highest among US states. An additional 17,715 reservists resided in the state.²¹ There are eight major military bases and installations in the state, including hospitals, such as the Naval Hospital Beaufort, training installations, such as Parris Island and Fort Jackson, and the Joint Base Charleston that on its own supports ninety thousand service members, civilians, and veterans.²² Statewide, there are more than sixty-eight thousand Department of Defense personnel and nearly four hundred thousand veterans living in the state.²³ The presence of these facilities in South Carolina provides a significant source of income. Defense contracts, which we discuss in more detail later, totaling over thirteen billion US dollars (USD) were committed in South Carolina between 2013 and 2017.²⁴ The total economic impact of the military is over thirty-four billion dollars, and one in every nine jobs in South Carolina can be traced to the military.²⁵ This is a marked increase from 2017, when the total economic impact was approximately twenty-four billion dollars, creating one in every twelve jobs in the state.²⁶ These military installations also support migration into the state, with increasing numbers of service members and contract workers coming to live, work, and spend in the state in recent years.

In addition to these economic benefits, the presence of these military installations makes South Carolina a strategic geopolitical location for the deployment of US troops. In the past, military troops from South Carolina have been deployed to serve American interests in the Middle East (specifically Afghanistan, Iraq, and recently Egypt).²⁷ Although the Biden administration has insisted that no American troops will be sent to Ukraine, there has been a significant increase in American troops in Europe more broadly, and South Carolina has a part to play in that effort.

In February 2022, in anticipation of Russia’s potential invasion of Ukraine, President Biden mobilized three thousand troops to Eastern Europe.²⁸ Notably, part of this group came from the Eighty-Second Airborne Unit in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They were deployed on C-17 aircraft out of the Joint Charleston Base in South Carolina, highlighting the geopolitical significance of South Carolina’s military installations. In June 2022, to both strengthen NATO’s borders and send Putin a message that the West is unified and prepared to defend its borders, President Biden committed an additional twenty thousand American troops to Europe, bringing the total American troop presence to over one-hundred thousand.²⁹ It is likely Page 188 →that South Carolina military installations will play a strategic role in these deployment efforts.

There are also social factors that reflect the multiscalar impacts of war. The deployment of troops from any location produces significant effects on the mental and physical health of the soldiers being deployed, as well as on children and spouses, who must cope with the absence of a family member.³⁰ Furthermore, negative effects can be seen on small businesses, as military deployments (particularly of reservists) can hurt employment and reduce the consumer base for a time.³¹ As sites of military training, logistics, and transport, South Carolina’s military installations and the troops, civilians, and contractors that serve there have a role to play in the Russia-Ukraine war and global geopolitics more broadly and will have to contend with these issues.

The defense industry, another product of militarization, also stands to influence the Russia-Ukraine war and affect both the South Carolina and US economies. As of the summer of 2022, over six billion USD in military and security assistance has been sent to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began. This security assistance includes weapons, ammunition, aircraft and other military vehicles, surveillance, communications and defense systems, and funding for training.³² This is a drop in the bucket compared with the other economic aid that the United States has committed in Ukraine, totaling over fifty billion USD.³³ This larger aid package has the potential to act as a “positive economic weapon”³⁴ by giving money directly to the Ukrainian government to help maintain its infrastructure and to address humanitarian needs.³⁵ However, the utility of this aid could be limited if the funds are not used appropriately or efficiently, and as such, there has been some criticism over the lack of US government oversight in how this money will be spent.³⁶ Either way, for states like South Carolina, there is the potential for a lot of money to be made in the defense industry.

Throughout the Palmetto State, defense contractors and defense industries contribute significantly to employment and state gross domestic product (GDP; approximately 2.5% of the state’s GDP per year).³⁷ In Charleston County alone, there are over eighty defense contractors that contribute to the aerospace, automotive, and tech industries, on and off existing military installations.³⁸ The aerospace industry, in particular, creates clear links Page 189 →between South Carolina and the Russia-Ukraine war. More than four hundred aerospace companies have a presence in South Carolina, including Boeing, GE Aviation, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, and Michelin Aircraft Tire Company. The aerospace industry employs more than one hundred thirty thousand people in the state and has created more than five thousand new jobs for South Carolinians, totaling over two billion USD in investment since 2011. The industry has an overall economic impact of twenty-eight billion USD, with over four billion USD in exports in 2020 alone.³⁹

The development of aerospace technology and the manufacturing of aerospace parts and aircraft in South Carolina will likely play a part in fulfilling the US commitment to security assistance in Ukraine, and, ultimately, the state could see more growth in defense industries, creating more job opportunities for South Carolinians. South Carolina’s strategic geopolitical location on the eastern seaboard creates a site advantage for defense corporations looking for easy access to labor, transportation, and military facilities. This multiscalar view of militarization in South Carolina complicates our notions of wars as disruptive economically, politically, and socially. In fact, militarization and the Russia-Ukraine war may actually benefit the people of South Carolina. That being said, all of these processes are also affected by the broader economic vulnerabilities created by the Ukraine war at the international scale.

Although militarization reveals some of the direct geopolitical impacts that South Carolina has on the Russia-Ukraine war, the impacts of the war on South Carolinians are most directly and broadly economic. The wide-ranging impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have combined to produce record inflation, supply chain issues, and changes in global demand. Some of the big exporters in South Carolina, such as Boeing in Charleston and BMW in Spartanburg, have had to shift their production and exports in response to the war. These economic relations also have the potential to affect the Russia-Ukraine war, as economic sanctions by the West are designed to hurt the Russian economy and war effort. As with the impacts of militarization, these economic relations have multiscalar impacts—from people’s pocketbooks and household incomes to the balance sheets of global corporations—and ultimately highlight the reciprocal effects of sanctions as economic tools.

Most Carolinians have already felt the effects of inflation, especially increased gas prices. The Federal Reserve Bank sets an annual inflation target of two percent, which it has met for most of the past twenty years, but by June 2022, the inflation rate was at 9.1%,⁴⁰ the highest rate since December 1981.⁴¹ The rate for the American South was even higher, at 9.8%.⁴² Inflation had already been rapidly increasing as the economy reopened amid the COVID-19 pandemic, but the war has increased supply chain concerns and, in particular, affected the price of gas and oil.

For South Carolinians, prices at the gas pump are one of the most visible impacts. Nationwide, gasoline was $1.05 more per gallon in May 2022 than it was on the day Russia invaded Ukraine.⁴³ By June 2022, the nationwide average went above five dollars per gallon for the first time.⁴⁴ In South Carolina, the average price per gallon was $4.31 on May 19, 2022, compared with $2.85 the year before.⁴⁵ Some of this increase may be directly related to US sanctions, which ban Russian oil imports. However, the United States only imported about eight percent of its petroleum from Russia in 2021.⁴⁶ Gas prices are driven primarily by world oil prices, which were ninety-six dollars per barrel the day before Russia invaded and shot up to almost one hundred twenty-eight dollars by March 8.⁴⁷ Russia is the world’s second-ranked exporter of oil and gas, after Saudi Arabia, and many countries have decided to stop purchasing from Russia, tightening demand for the rest of the world’s supply.

Food prices have also been driving inflation, both before the invasion and continuing since then.⁴⁸ Inflation for food is higher than for the all-item average, and this is worse in the South than for the nation as a whole.⁴⁹ Food prices have spiked, in part, because Ukraine is a major agricultural producer. On the basis of the 2021 harvest, Ukraine was the seventh worldwide producer of wheat and the fifth exporter, accounting for nine percent of global exports. Ukraine’s exports primarily go to Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, rather than the United States, but a drop in these exports affects the world wheat supply and world prices. At the time of the invasion, about ninety-five percent of Ukraine’s exports from the 2021 harvest had already been shipped, so the greatest impacts on the global food market may come with the 2022 harvest (July to September) and beyond.

Ukraine also produces and/or exports large shares of the world’s sunflowers, corn, barley, and rapeseed.⁵⁰ Exports of most of these crops have fallen by half since the war started. The general difficulties of war, port Page 191 →blockades, difficulties in transitioning to other modes of transport, and even accusations that the Russians are stealing grain have all limited global supply and increased world prices.⁵¹ At the local scale, South Carolinians have already seen grocery prices increase, which is an added burden, especially on middle- and lower income households. However, it is important to note that the greatest impact will be in the Global South and in countries that are particularly dependent on Ukrainian crops, where threats of famine abound.

Russia produces and exports a large share of the world’s fertilizer, which has dealt another blow to global agricultural production. Because rising costs of natural gas, producing fertilizer elsewhere will also be more expensive. Meanwhile, several countries have placed export restrictions on fertilizer to ensure that they will have enough supply domestically. As a result, fertilizer prices have been spiking and are likely to remain high, including in South Carolina.⁵² This drives further increases in food prices, as farmers need to recoup the money spent on fertilizer and could also lead to less food if farmers choose to decrease planting. Planting decisions today affect future harvests, so there are long-term implications to these price changes: Even if the war ended today, increased prices for fertilizer could affect the food supply over the next few years. Agribusiness is South Carolina’s largest economic sector.⁵³ As there is currently no end to the war in sight, South Carolina’s farmers and the economy more broadly are increasingly vulnerable.

In addition to these broader inflationary concerns, South Carolina holds a geopolitical position as a significant exporter of goods to Russia, which can affect both Russia’s war effort and South Carolina’s economy. Of all the US states, South Carolina was ranked fourth in 2021 in terms of the value of goods exported to Russia, and of all other countries that import South Carolina’s exports, Russia ranked fourteenth.⁵⁴ Exports to Russia grew over the course of 2021 and were a leading driver of the growth in South Carolina’s exports that year, with a one hundred sixty-two percent or $17.9 million increase.⁵⁵ This relatively high (and growing) level of trade with Russia means that US sanctions, such as government bans on certain exports or voluntary decisions by businesses to cut off trade, may affect South Carolina more than other states. Accordingly, these disruptions to Russia’s trade with South Carolina may have more impact on Russia and, if sanctions work as designed, on its political decisions and war effort.

Page 192 →The potential impacts of South Carolina’s export economy on the Russia-Ukraine war can be seen in South Carolina’s largest export category: transportation equipment, including aircraft and automobiles. As discussed earlier, defense industries in South Carolina play a role in the security assistance that the United States is providing to Ukraine. However, transportation equipment exports, especially from the Charleston Boeing plant and the Spartanburg BMW plant, may face challenges in adapting to this geopolitical moment, as the war and sanctions make it difficult for these industries to get the materials necessary for production.

For example, the aerospace industry, which includes Boeing, faces challenges because it needs titanium from both Russia and Ukraine. However, Boeing has been stockpiling titanium and diversifying its supply since the 2014 invasion of Crimea and is, therefore, less reliant on current imports from Russia and Ukraine, putting the company in a better position than its main competitor, Airbus.⁵⁶ Still, Boeing has stopped importing titanium from Russia and has stopped all support to Russian customers, including supplying repair parts and engineering and maintenance support.⁵⁷ The company also marked orders for some jets as questionable, especially those to airlines in Russia and Ukraine. As a result, in April 2022, Boeing estimated losing orders for about ninety aircraft because of the conflict.⁵⁸ Boeing and Airbus have both seen their stock prices drop since the invasion, and they were in line with one another for the first few months of the war, although Boeing’s did drop more after a quarterly report at the end of April 2022, and its dropoff remains greater at the time of writing.⁵⁹

The automobile industry is similarly affected by limitations on the supply of necessary resources and parts, as well as by a loss of sales. Ukraine supplies about half of the world’s neon gas, which is used for semiconductor production.⁶⁰ Ukraine also produced important automobile components, especially automotive wiring harnesses. Russia has been a key supplier of both palladium for catalytic converters and nickel for alloys and lithium-ion batteries.⁶¹ These types of supply chain issues did interrupt production at several BMW plants.⁶² Much like Boeing, BMW also halted manufacturing in and exports to Russia in response to the war.⁶³ The latter matters for the South Carolina plant because, in 2020, about five percent of its exports went to Russia, making it the fifth-ranked destination.⁶⁴ In response to these decisions and constraints, BMW did slightly scale down its earnings targets.⁶⁵ These types of business decisions and sanctions by Western governments also seem to be having an impact on Russian car production: Recent numbers announced by the Russian government agency Rosstat suggest that car Page 193 →production in Russia was ninety-seven percent less in May 2022, than a year earlier.⁶⁶ This combination of decreased domestic production in Russia and decreased imports of cars from abroad is likely to be felt by the Russian population, ideally leading them to put pressure on the government to change its behavior or, if that does not work, then arguably as an economic weapon against Russia.⁶⁷

The Russia-Ukraine war has produced significant economic impacts for Russia and, to a lesser extent, for South Carolina. Globalization helps explain why the prices of goods such as oil, crops, and fertilizer depend on the world market and why the war affects businesses, farmers, and consumers in South Carolina. The globalization of trade and economics is also what makes sanctions against Russia useful as a possible economic tool or weapon. Globalization also opens the door for individual companies to make voluntary business decisions that can affect geopolitics from the bottom up, such as BMW and Boeing’s decision to halt business with Russia. Those corporate decisions are also driven, at least in part, from the bottom-up, from the scale of individual consumers and activists who leverage the power of civil society to push these corporations to act and thereby potentially impact the course of the war.

Individuals of Ukrainian descent are particularly likely to be motivated to try to affect the course of the war. Even before the war, Ukraine had the largest European diaspora (about 5.9 million people),⁶⁸ and US Census Bureau data from 2020 suggest that there are about twelve thousand people with Ukrainian ancestry living in South Carolina.⁶⁹ These people are likely to respond to the war and news coverage of it more strongly than others. Research by Rostam and Haverkamp into how Iraqi expatriates responded to coverage of the Iraq War found that they had a heightened focus on the news, especially out of concern for relatives and their homeland.⁷⁰ More specifically, expatriates felt frustrated and angry when coverage did not focus enough attention on humanitarian concerns and cultural context. Ukrainians living in South Carolina have similarly expressed concern about relatives and others in Ukraine, anger at the destruction of their cities, and feelings of powerlessness at not being able to do more.⁷¹

Whereas some people may feel a sense of powerlessness, others will likely feel the need to educate others about their people and homeland.⁷² Still others have turned to activism to help the war effort and people affected by the war. These efforts are not new, and previous action by the Page 194 →Ukrainian diaspora has already made a difference in democratization and politics in Ukraine.⁷³ For example, in response to the Euromaidan protests in 2013, Ukrainian-Americans founded the activist group Razom (meaning “together” in Ukrainian), which gathered humanitarian aid, published legal reports, monitored and countered propaganda, disseminated information, supported independent media and civil society in Ukraine, and mobilized Ukrainian-Americans to vote in Ukrainian elections. In the United States, Razom also raised awareness and pushed other Americans and the US government to act in support of Ukraine.⁷⁴ Razom has responded similarly to the current war, seeking to raise awareness and action at the national scale.⁷⁵

In South Carolina, groups like “World for Ukraine,” “South Carolina Stands with Ukraine,” and Charleston-based “CHS4Ukraine” have been gathering supplies to send to Ukraine, holding rallies and awareness events, and lobbying local officials.⁷⁶ Another way that Ukrainians abroad can engage is through the power of social media, which has been used for identity building, networking, and community engagement. Social media has been helpful in countering propaganda and encouraging direct participation through volunteering and donating. A Facebook group called “Ukrainians in the Carolinas” seems to be particularly active in providing information on those seeking to assist refugees to the United States.⁷⁷ Other groups, such as Lutheran Services Carolinas, are also working in refugee resettlement and anticipate settling about three hundred fifty Ukrainian refugees into South Carolina.⁷⁸ These types of activism and engagement are some clear ways that South Carolinians are influencing the conflict in Ukraine, from the bottom-up. The processes of globalization and time-space compression make it possible for Ukrainian communities living abroad to raise awareness, influence their new governments, and provide targeted assistance to those most affected by the war, thereby shaping geopolitics.

When most South Carolinians think about the Russia-Ukraine war, they may sympathize with the Ukrainian people and be broadly concerned that the United States will become directly involved in the conflict, either through a Russian attack or through a decision to send troops into Ukrainian battlefields. However, they are likely less aware of the numerous, often less obvious ways that South Carolina’s people and economy are already an active part of the geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine war. In this essay, we have highlighted some of the ways that South Carolina affects and is affected Page 195 →by the Russia-Ukraine war through militarization, economic globalization, and Ukrainian communities living within the state.

This reciprocal relationship between South Carolina and the geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine war is made possible through globalization and time-space compression. Much of the popular discussion of globalization tends to focus on the top-down, economic elements, such as the dominance of global corporations or the spread of McDonald’s around the globe. This is certainly one important aspect, as we have shown through the importance of the military industrial complex, interconnected supply chains, and worldwide changes to oil and food prices. However, it is important to also consider the bottom-up processes, where individuals and those on a local scale can affect global outcomes. The role of South Carolinians who serve in the military or who are connected to the defense industry and broader processes of militarization will both be affected by and affect the Russia-Ukraine war. The Ukrainian diaspora, even the small segment of it located in South Carolina, can make a difference through donations, raising awareness, lobbying governments, helping resettle refugees, and battling misinformation. The decisions of companies to stop sales and support to Russia can go where sanctions have not and strengthen the Western economic response to the invasion. In short, meaningful geopolitical action happens at every geographic scale.

The Ukrainian cause has found support in South Carolina and the United States for numerous reasons, including the legacy of Cold War tensions between Russia and the United States as well as a broad sense of shared identity (e.g., Christianity, Europeanness). However, the interconnectedness that we demonstrate between South Carolina and Ukraine is not due to some special relationship between these two locations—it is truly global. Similar arguments could be made about other locations and conflicts, even if there is less cultural affinity between the peoples involved. In exploring these relationships, we not only hope to demonstrate how people in the Carolinas have potential roles in the Russia-Ukraine war but also hope that this discussion serves as a reminder that we cannot consider geopolitical conflict in all its forms as ever just “over there,” as somehow disconnected from our own homes and communities. This is especially important, because the longer a conflict lasts, the less likely it is to hold the attention of people and places that are far from the epicenter of a conflict. Currently, there is no end in sight to the Ukraine war and, as such, no end to the potential economic, social, and political impacts that will ripple across the globe, or our ability to influence them.

Page 196 →Lauren K. Perez is assistant professor of political science at Francis Marion University. Her research focuses on politics in multilevel settings, especially on the interactions between domestic and European-level legislative politics in the European Union.

Jennifer L. Titanski-Hooper is assistant professor of geography and the director of the Governor Robert E. McNair Institute for Research and Service at Francis Marion University. She specializes in European geopolitics and has written on issues of national identity and the processes of Europeanization in the former Yugoslavia.

1. 1. Note that the authors of this article have equal authorship and are listed alphabetically.
2. 2. Sarah Habershon, Rob England, Becky Dale, and Olga Ivshina, “War in Ukraine: Can we say how many people have died?” BBC News, July 1, 2022, www.bbc.com. When writing about an ongoing conflict, we recognize that some specifics will become out of date, but we believe that the argument of this essay holds, and we hope that the data and examples provided offer valuable historical evidence of the early days of the Russia-Ukraine war.
3. 3. Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–50.
4. 4. See Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
5. 5. See Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Steve Pickering, “Wars Are Becoming Less Frequent: A Response to Harrison and Wolf,” Economic History Review 67, no. 1 (2014): 214–30.
6. 6. For a useful discussion to the concept of scale, see Andrew Herod and Melissa W. Wright, “Placing Scale: An Introduction,” in Geographies of Power: Placing Scale, ed. Herod and Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 1–14.
7. 7. Emily Williams, “Understand SC: South Carolinians Stand with Ukraine,” Post and Courier, March 3, 2022, www.postandcourier.com.
8. 8. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange, 4th edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019), passim.
9. 9. See Lauren K. Perez, “Building a Bridge to Europe? National Legislators’ Views on Their Role in the EU,” in The European Union and Beyond: Multi-Level Governance, Institutions, and Policy-Making, ed. Jae-Jae Spoon and Nils Ringe (New York: ECPR Press, Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), 117–38; Jennifer Titanski-Hooper, “‘The Belly of Zagreb’: Identity, Development, and Europeanization in Croatia’s Open-Air Markets,” (PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2017).
10. 10. See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991).
11. 11. Page 197 →See Timothy Graham and Jay Daniel Thompson, “Russian Government Accounts are Using a Twitter Loophole to Spread Disinformation,” The Conversation, March 15, 2022, https://theconversation.com.
12. 12. Doreen Massey, “Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place,” in Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, ed. John Bird, et al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 75–85.
13. 13. These perspectives on geopolitics were infamously deployed by Nazi Germany to justify its territorial ambitions, which ultimately worked to widely discredit the field, particularly within geography. As a discipline, geopolitics has since revived in various forms (critical, popular environmental, and feminist) as both an attempt to rehabilitate the discipline and also recognize the continued importance of the interrelationships between politics and geography. For examples of traditional geopolitics, see Halford J. MacKinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History (1904),” The Geographical Journal 170, no. 4 (2004): 298–321; and Friedrich Ratzel, “The Territorial Growth of States,” Scottish Geographical Magazine 12, no. 7 (1896): 351–61.
14. 14. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War,” YouTube video, 2:36, June 16, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM.
15. 15. See John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.
16. 16. Robert Person and Michael McFaul, “What Putin Fears Most,” The Journal of Democracy, February 22, 2022, www.journalofdemocracy.org/.
17. 17. See Lorraine Dowler and Joanne Sharp, “A Feminist Geopolitics?” Space and Polity 5, no. 3 (2001): 165–76.
18. 18. See Jennifer Hyndman, “Towards a Feminist Geopolitics,” The Canadian Geographer 45, no. 2 (2001): 210–22.
19. 19. See Jennifer Fluri, “Geopolitics of Gender and Violence ‘from Below,’” Political Geography 28, no. 4 (2009): 259–65.
20. 20. Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarization: Feminists Make the Link (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield 2007).
21. 21. US Department of Defense, “2020 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community,” 32, 78., https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/.
22. 22. South Carolina Department of Veterans Affairs, “SC Military Base Task Force,” SC.gov, http://scdva.sc.gov.
23. 23. Joseph C. Von Nessen, “The Economic Impact of South Carolina’s Military Community,” SC Department of Veterans Affairs, June 2022, https://scdva.sc.gov/sites/scdva/files/Documents/.
24. 24. Thomas Novelly and Bryan Brussee, “From Making Fighter Jets to Food Rations, War is Big Business in South Carolina,” The Post and Courier, June 14, 2019, updated June 3, 2021, https://www.postandcourier.com/news/.
25. 25. Von Nessen, “The Economic Impact of South Carolina’s Military Community.”
26. 26. Ibid.
27. 27. See Thomas Novelly, “Where SC National Guard troops are deployed in the Middle East as tensions rise with Iran,” Post and Courier, January 3, 2020, www.postandcourier.com; Rachel Ripp, “South Carolina National Guard deploying Page 198 →50 soldiers to Egypt,” WLTX-TV, April 20, 2022, www.wltx.com; Jeff Wilkinson, “SC has a big role to play in Afghanistan,” The State, February 10, 2017, www.thestate.com.
28. 28. Chase Laudenslager, “Joint Base Charleston Assisting with Deployment of Troops to Europe amid Russia, Ukraine Tension,” WCBD News 2, February 4, 2022, www.counton2.com.
29. 29. Jim Garamone, “Biden Announces Changes in U.S. Force Posture in Europe,” DOD News, June 29, 2022, www.defense.gov.
30. 30. See Stéphanie Vincent Lyk-Jensen et al., “The Effect of Military Deployment on Mental Health,” Economics and Human Biology 23 (2016): 193–208; Alan J. Lincoln and Kathie Sweeten, “Considerations for the Effects of Military Deployment on Children and Families,” Social Work in Healthcare 50, no. 1 (2011): 73–84; Sean C. Sheppard et al., “The Impact of Deployment on U.S. Military Families,” American Psychologist 65, no. 6 (2010): 599–609.
31. 31. See Martin Bressler and Linda Bressler, “A study of veteran-owned small businesses and the impact of military reserve call-ups since 9/11,” Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal 19, no. 2 (2012): 1–22.
32. 32. US Department of Defense, “Factsheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” July 5, 2022, www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/.
33. 33. Bianca Pallaro and Alicia Parlapiano, “The Upshot: Four Ways to Understand the $54 Billion in U.S. Spending on Ukraine,” New York Times, May 20, 2022, www.nytimes.com.
34. 34. Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 12.
35. 35. USAID, “The United States Contributes $1.3 Billion to Support the Government of Ukraine,” Press Releases, June 30, 2022, www.usaid.gov; USAID, “The United States Announces Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Ukraine,” Press Releases, July 9, 2022, www.usaid.gov.
36. 36. See Kelsey Snell, “Biden Signs a $40 Billion Aid Package to Help Ukraine Fight off the Russian Invasion,” NPR, May 21, 2022, www.npr.org.
37. 37. See Novelly and Brussee, “From Making Fighter Jets to Food Rations”; and “Military’s Impact on State Economies,” National Conference of State Legislators, April 9, 2018, https://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/.
38. 38. “Key Industries,” Charleston County Economic Development, https://www.charlestoncountydevelopment.org/key-industries/.
39. 39. South Carolina Department of Commerce, “Aerospace Industry Snapshot, 2021,” https://www.sccommerce.com/industries/aerospace-industry.
40. 40. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Summary,” Economic News Release, July 13, 2022, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm.
41. 41. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average [CPIAUCSL],” FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=ANNk.
42. 42. Southeast Information Office, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index, South Region—June 2022,” www.bls.gov.
43. 43. AAA, “Nowhere to Go but Up?” AAA, May 23, 2022, Gas Prices, https://gasprices.aaa.com.
44. 44. Page 199 →AAA, “National Average Hits New All-Time High at $5 per Gallon,” Gas Prices, https://gasprices.aaa.com.
45. 45. AAA, “South Carolina Average Gas Prices,” Gas Prices, https://gasprices.aaa.com.
46. 46. US Energy Information Administration, “The United States Imports More Petroleum Products than Crude Oil from Russia,” Today in Energy, March 22, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51738.
47. 47. “CO1 Commodity Quote - Generic 1st ‘CO’ Future,” Bloomberg.com, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CO1:COM.
48. 48. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “FAO Food Price Index,” https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/.
49. 49. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index Summary,” July 13, 2022, www.bls.gov; Southeast Information Office, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index, South Region—June 2022,” www.bls.gov.
50. 50. Foreign Agricultural Service, US Department of Agriculture, “Ukraine Agricultural Production and Trade,” April 2022, https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf.
51. 51. Wailin Wong and Darian Woods, “Russia Has Blocked 20 Million Tons of Grain from Being Exported from Ukraine,” South Carolina Public Radio, June 3, 2022, www.southcarolinapublicradio.org.
52. 52. Charlotte Hebebrand and David Laborde, “High Fertilizer Prices Contribute to Rising Global Food Security Concerns,” IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute, April 25, 2022, www.ifpri.org; US Department of Agriculture, “South Carolina Crop Production Report | ID: 5712m658s,” Economics, Statistics and Market Information System, https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/.
53. 53. “SC Farm Facts,” South Carolina Farm Bureau, https://www.scfb.org/ag-education/.
54. 54. US Census Bureau: Economic Indicators Division USA Trade Online, “State Exports by NAICS Commodities,” https://usatrade.census.gov/data/Perspective60/View/dispview.aspx.
55. 55. “South Carolina,” OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec. world/en/profile/subnational_usa_state/sc.
56. 56. Joseph Mellors, “Boeing: Why the Ukraine Crisis Could Help It Become the World’s Number One Aircraft Maker Again,” The Conversation, March 15, 2022, http://theconversation.com.
57. 57. Dave Calhoun, “Boeing CEO Updates Employees on First-Quarter Results,” Boeing Media Room, April 27, 2022, https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=131041.
58. 58. Chris Isidore, “Boeing Loses More than 90 Jet Orders Due to War in Ukraine,” CNN, April 12, 2022, www.cnn.com.
59. 59. “BA: Boeing Co/The Stock Price Quote,” Bloomberg.com, July 1, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/BA:US; Bloomberg, “EADSY: Airbus SE/The Stock Price Quote,” Bloomberg.com, July 1, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EADSY:US.
60. 60. Samantha DeCarlo and Samuel Goodman, “Ukraine, Neon, and Semiconductors,” Executive Briefings on Trade, US International Trade Commission, April 2022, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/.
61. 61. Page 200 →Klaus Ulrich, “Ukraine War: German Auto Industry Alarmed over Lack of Raw Materials,” Deutsche Welle, April 1, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/.
62. 62. Nicolas Peter, “Statement Dr. Nicolas Peter, Member of the Board of Management of BMW AG, Finance, Annual Conference 2022,” BMW Group Press Club, March 16, 2022, https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0374315EN/.
63. 63. Oliver Zipse, “Statement and Presentation Oliver Zipse, Chairman of the Board of Management of BMW AG, 102nd Annual General Meeting of BMW AG in Munich on 11th May 2022,” BMW Group Press Club, May 11, 2022, https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0388653EN/.
64. 64. “BMW Manufacturing Remains Largest U.S. Automotive Exporter by Value,” BMW Group, February 11, 2021, https://www.bmwgroup-werke.com/spartanburg/en/news/2021/
65. 65. Zipse, “Statement and Presentation.”
66. 66. “Russia’s Car Manufacturing Collapses by 97% in May,” The Moscow Times, June 30, 2022, sec. news, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/30/.
67. 67. Mulder, The Economic Weapon.
68. 68. Olga Oleinikova and Jumana Bayeh, Democracy, Diaspora, Territory: Europe and Cross-Border Politics (Milton, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019).
69. 69. US Census Bureau, “DP02: Selected Social Characteristics in the United States - Census Bureau Table,” https://data.census.gov/cedsci/.
70. 70. Hajera Rostam and Beth E. Haverkamp, “Iraqi Expatriates’ Experience of North American Media Coverage of the Iraq War,” International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 100–17, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10447-009-071-7.
71. 71. Sarah Sheridan, “Ukrainians Living in South Carolina Feel ‘Powerless’ as Their Families Turn into Refugees,” The Greenville News, March 7, 2022, www.greenvilleonline.com.
72. 72. Rostam and Haverkamp, “Iraqi Expatriates’ Experience.”
73. 73. Oleinikova and Bayeh, Democracy, Diaspora, Territory.
74. 74. Serhiy Kovalchuk and Alla Korzh, “The Transnational Activism of Young Ukrainian Immigrants,” in Democracy, Diaspora, Territory: Europe and Cross-Border Politics, ed. Olga Oleinikova and Jumana Bayeh (Milton, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 127–44.
75. 75. “Newsletter #18: Want to Know What Kind of Impact Your Donations Are Having?” Razom (blog), June 7, 2022, https://www.razomforukraine.org/newsletter-18/.
76. 76. The World for Ukraine, “About ‘World for Ukraine’ Nonprofit,” https://www.theworldforukraine.org/, “Home,” South Carolina Stands With Ukraine, https://www.scstandswithukraine.com; CHS4Ukraine, “Home,” CHS4Ukraine, https://www.chs4ukraine.org/.
77. 77. “Ukrainians in the Carolinas Украінці Кароліни” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/groups/937155979649761/.
78. 78. Erin Kidd, “Lutheran Services Carolinas Anticipates Serving Ukrainian Refugees,” Lutheran Services Carolinas (blog), May 27, 2022, https://lscarolinas.net.

• Agnew, John. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.
• Bressler, Martin, and Linda Bressler. “A Study of Veteran-Owned Small Businesses and the Impact of Military Reserve Call-ups Since 9/11.” Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal 19, no. 2 (2012): 1–22.
• BMW Group. “BMW Manufacturing Remains Largest U.S. Automotive Exporter by Value.” Last modified February 11, 2021. https://www.bmwgroup-werke.com/spartanburg/en/news/2021/.
• Calhoun, Dave. “Boeing CEO Updates Employees on First-Quarter Results.” Boeing Media Room. Last modified April 27, 2022. https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=131041.
• Charleston County Economic Development. “Key Industries.” https://www.charlestoncountydevelopment.org/key-industries/.
• CHS4Ukraine, “Home.” https://www.chs4ukraine.org/.
• DeCarlo, Samantha, and Samuel Goodman. “Ukraine, Neon, and Semiconductors.” Executive Briefings on Trade. U.S. International Trade Commission, April 2022. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/.
• Dowler, Lorraine, and Joanne Sharp. “A Feminist Geopolitics?” Space and Polity 5, no. 3 (2001): 165–76.
• Enloe, Cynthia. Globalization and Militarization: Feminists Make the Link. Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.
• Fazal, Tanisha. State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
• Fluri, Jennifer. “Geopolitics of Gender and Violence ‘from Below.’” Political Geography 28, no. 4 (2009): 259–65.
• Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “FAO Food Price Index.” https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/.
• FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average [CPIAUCSL].” Accessed June 1, 2022. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=ANNk.
• Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Steve Pickering. “Wars Are Becoming Less Frequent: A Response to Harrison and Wolf.” The Economic History Review 67, no. 1 (2014): 214–30.
• Graham, Timothy, and Jay Daniel Thompson. “Russian Government Accounts are Using a Twitter Loophole to Spread Disinformation.” The Conversation, March 15, 2022. https://theconversation.com.
• Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.
• Hebebrand, Charlotte, and David Laborde. “High Fertilizer Prices Contribute to Rising Global Food Security Concerns,” IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute, April 25, 2022. www.ifpri.org.
• Herod, Andrew, and Melissa W. Wright. “Placing Scale: An Introduction.” In Geographies of Power: Placing Scale, edited by Andrew Herod and Melissa W. Wright, 1–14. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
• Page 202 →Hyndman, Jennifer. “Towards a Feminist Geopolitics.” The Canadian Geographer 45, no. 2 (2001): 210–22.
• Kidd, Erin. “Lutheran Services Carolinas Anticipates Serving Ukrainian Refugees.” Lutheran Services Carolinas (blog). May 27, 2022. https://lscarolinas.net.
• Kovalchuk, Serhiy, and Alla Korzh. “The Transnational Activism of Young Ukrainian Immigrants.” In Democracy, Diaspora, Territory: Europe and Cross-Border Politics, edited by Olga Oleinikova and Jumana Bayeh, 127–44. Milton, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.
• Lincoln, Alan J., and Kathie Sweeten. “Considerations for the Effects of Military Deployment on Children and Families.” Social Work in Healthcare 50, no. 1 (2011): 73–84.
• Lyk-Jensen, Stéphanie Vincent, et al. “The Effect of Military Deployment on Mental Health.” Economics and Human Biology 23 (2016): 193–208.
• MacKinder, Halford J. “The Geographical Pivot of History (1904).” The Geographical Journal 170, no. 4 (2004): 298–321.
• Massey, Doreen. “Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place.” In Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, edited by John Bird, et al., 75–85. London: Routledge, 1993.
• Mearsheimer, John J. “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War.” YouTube. 2:36. June 16, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM.
• Mellors, Joseph. “Boeing: Why the Ukraine Crisis Could Help It Become the World’s Number One Aircraft Maker Again.” The Conversation, March 15, 2022.
• Mulder, Nicholas. The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022.
• National Conference of State Legislators. “Military’s Impact on State Economies.” April 9, 2018. https://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/military-s-impact-on-state-economies.aspx.
• “Newsletter #18: Want to Know What Kind of Impact Your Donations Are Having?” Razom (blog). June 7, 2022. https://www.razomforukraine.org/newsletter-18/.
• OEC-The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “South Carolina.” https://oec.world/en/profile/subnational_usa_state/sc.
• Oleinikova, Olga, and Jumana Bayeh. Democracy, Diaspora, Territory: Europe and Cross-Border Politics. Milton, UK: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.
• Perez, Lauren K. “Building a Bridge to Europe? National Legislators’ Views on Their Role in the EU.” In The European Union and Beyond: Multi-Level Governance, Institutions, and Policy-Making, edited by Jae-Jae Spoon and Nils Ringe, 117–38. New York: ECPR Press, 2020.
• Person, Robert, and Michael McFaul. “What Putin Fears Most.” Journal of Democracy, February 22, 2022. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/.
• Peter, Nicolas. “Statement Dr Nicolas Peter, Member of the Board of Management of BMW AG, Finance, Annual Conference 2022.” BMW Group PressClub. March 16, 2022. https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0374315EN/.
• Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange. 4th edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2019.
• Page 203 →Ratzel, Friedrich. “The Territorial Growth of States.” Scottish Geographical Magazine 12, no. 7 (1896): 351–61.
• Rostam, Hajera, and Beth E. Haverkamp. “Iraqi Expatriates’ Experience of North American Media Coverage of the Iraq War.” International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 100–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10447–009–9071–7.
• Sheppard, Sean C., Jennifer Weil Malatras, and Allen C. Israel. “The Impact of Deployment on U.S. Military Families.” American Psychologist 65, no. 6 (2010): 599–609.
• South Carolina Department of Commerce. “Aerospace Industry Snapshot, 2021.” https://www.sccommerce.com/industries/aerospace-industry.
• South Carolina Department of Veterans Affairs. “SC Military Base Task Force.” SC.gov. http://scdva.sc.gov.
• South Carolina Farm Bureau. “SC Farm Facts.” https://www.scfb.org/ag-education/food-farm-facts.
• South Carolina Stands With Ukraine. “Home.” https://www.scstandswithukraine.com.
• Southeast Information Office, US Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Consumer Price Index, South Region—June 2022.” www.bls.gov.
• Titanski-Hooper, Jennifer. “‘The Belly of Zagreb’: Identity, Development, and Europeanization in Croatia’s Open-Air Markets.” PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2017.
• US Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Consumer Price Index Summary, July 13, 2022.” www.bls.gov.
• US Census Bureau: 2020: ACS 5-Year Estimates Data Profiles. “DP02: Selected Social Characteristics in the United States-Census Bureau Table.” https://data.census.gov/cedsci/.
• US Census Bureau: Economic Indicators Division USA Trade Online. “State Exports by NAICS Commodities.” https://usatrade.census.gov/data/Perspective60/View/dispview.aspx.
• US Department of Agriculture: Economics, Statistics and Market Information System. “South Carolina Crop Production Report | ID: 5712m658s.” https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/5712m658s?locale=en#release-items.
• US Department of Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service. “Ukraine Agricultural Production and Trade, April 2022.” https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022–04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf.
• US Department of Defense. 2020 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community. https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2020-demographics-report.pdf.
• US Department of Defense. “Factsheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, July 5, 2022.” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/.
• United States Energy Information Administration. Today in Energy, March 22, 2022. “The United States Imports More Petroleum Products than Crude Oil from Russia.” https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51738.
• Von Nessen, Joseph C. “The Economic Impact of South Carolina’s Military Community.” South Carolina Military Base Task Force. April 2017. https://scdva.sc.gov/sc-military-base-task-force.
• Page 204 →Wong, Wailin, and Darian Woods. “Russia Has Blocked 20 Million Tons of Grain from Being Exported from Ukraine.” South Carolina Public Radio. June 3, 2022. www.southcarolinapublicradio.org.
• The World for Ukraine. “About ‘World for Ukraine’ Nonprofit.” https://www.theworldforukraine.org/about.
• Zacher, Mark W. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force.” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–50.
• Zipse, Oliver. “Statement and Presentation Oliver Zipse, Chairman of the Board of Management of BMW AG, 102nd Annual General Meeting of BMW AG in Munich on 11th May 2022.” BMW Group Press Club, May 11, 2022. https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0388653EN/.